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The  recent  hike  in  food  prices  has  been  of  great  concern  to  policymakers,  international 
organisations and donor agencies. In this paper we discuss, both from a partial and general 
equilibrium  perspective,  the  impact  of  the  recent  price  increase  on  maize  on  Kenyan 
households. Simulating a 100% increase in maize prices, we find that the headcount ratio in 
urban areas increased by 3-4 percentage unit points, depending on the size of windfall gain to 
producers. Based on the assumption that the price shock is passed through in total to the 
farmers, food poverty in the rural areas could be reduced by almost 14%. If incomes are not 
passed through, rural food poverty would increase quite significantly in some provinces. It is 
the poorest of the poor in both urban and rural areas who are most adversely affected. Policy 
reforms, which would reduce marketing margins and fertiliser prices, would be important 
factors in promoting a positive impact on performance in the maize sector. The regional maize 
trade  within  East  Africa  seems  to  have  a  role  to  play,  and  exploring  the  impact  of  total 
integration of the maize markets could be a topic of further research.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The  recent  hike  in  food  prices  has  been  of  great  concern  to  policymakers,  international 
organisations and donor agencies. A number of recent studies have looked at the impact of 
escalating  food  prices  and  how  these  affect  poverty  both  globally,  and  in  a  number  of 
countries. A common finding is that poverty will generally rise in the short-term following 
increased food prices. For example, Zezza et al. (2008) find that the most vulnerable are the 
urban, rural non-farm, larger and less educated households. Dessus et al. (2008) find that 
additional costs of alleviating urban poverty could, for some countries, exceed 3% of GDP. 
Ivanic and Martin (2008) suggest that the increase in commodity prices has added 100 million 
additional people to the ranks of the poor. This corresponds to a loss of almost seven years of 
work in eradicating global poverty. Reviewing the evidence of the potential impact of higher 
food prices in sub-Saharan Africa, Wodon and Zaman (2008) find that the poor are likely to 
be significantly affected. For example, in West and Central Africa, a 50% price rise in cereals 
could increase, in the short term, the share of those in poverty by 4.4%. When potential gains 
for producers are factored in, the headcount index would still increase by 2.5 percentage 
points. This is in line with earlier results which find that higher food prices are likely to 
increase  poverty  in  a  number  of  African  countries  even  after  countervailing  wage  and 
productivity effects are taken into account (Christiansen and Demery 2006). 
  Other  set  of  studies  has  focused  on  the  country-specific  impact  of  the  food 
crisis.  Arndt  et  al  (2008),  in  a  study  on  Mozambique,  note  that  urban  households  and 
households  located  in  the  South  are  more  vulnerable  to  food  price  increases,  while  rural 
households, on the other hand, often benefit from their net seller position, particularly those in 
the  mid-income  distribution  bracket.  They  conclude  that  the  macroeconomic  and  poverty 
impacts of a global price increase will be negative and substantial, particularly for urban 
households. Reys et al. (2009) analyse the impact of changes in the prices of rice and fuel on 
poverty in the Philippines. They conclude that the impact varies across different household 
groups, depending on the level of urbanity, income group and geographical location. Urban 
households are the more adversely affected group compared to those living in rural areas. In 
addition, the poorest household are the most vulnerable to price change. Although a large 
portion of the rice farmers would benefit from price increases, the poorest farmers tend to be 
adversely affected. 
The Kenyan economy experienced significant improvement in its performance 
during 2004-2007. Annual average GDP growth was close to 6%, a remarkable improvement 3 
 
compared to the 1990s. This also had a positive impact on poverty; the headcount ratio fell 
from 52.3% in 1997 to 45.9% in 2005. However, during 2008 the economy was severely 
affected by a number of domestic and external shocks. The post-election crisis was felt in the 
agricultural  sector,  as  a  large  number  of  farmers  had  to  abandon  their  farms.  This  had 
ramifications not only with regard to the stocks of cereals harvested late in 2007 but also for 
planting preparation for the 2008 season.  
The  Kenyan  crisis  seems  to  have  had  an  impact  on  regional  maize  prices.
1 
Benson et al. (2008)  argue that higher global food prices may have a si gnificant secondary 
effect on Ugandan food markets, particularly when coupled with the high demand of maize 
from Kenya.
2 Maize trade is still restricted by various non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Karugia et 
al (2009) observe that the NTB cost accounted for approximately 35% of the maize trade in 
Kenya, while the remaining 65% is due to cost of transportation.  
  Dry  weather  in  some  parts  of  Kenya  delayed  growth,  and  the  surge  in 
international food prices had a negative  outcome on the economy, as the country is a  net-
importer of maize, rice, wheat and other cereals. Although oil prices have dropped, the surge 
in 2007-2008 affected the economy negatively. Finally, the global financial crisis also  had 
economic  ramifications,  as  the  global  recession  reduced  demand  fo r  Kenyan  exports, 
particular  in  the flower industry.  Despite the recession, r emittances from Kenyans living 
abroad are still high.   
  The maize sector has been one of the most  severely hit  sectors.  During the 
second half of the 2008, maize prices increased significantly and the Government reacted by 
introducing  short-term  emergency  measures.  Focusing  on  measures  such  as  the  re-
introduction  of  price  controls  opened  up  several  avenues  for  rent -seeking  activities.  In 
addition in order to keep domestic production within the country, exports of maize grain and 
flour  were  banned.
3  In November 2008,  triggered by  its  rising price, the Government of 
Kenya announced that it would subsidize maize flour. The programme, however, was quickly 
abandoned because of mismanagement (IMF 2009). 
One would expect that the recent maize price movements, coupled with other factors, 
have had a profound impact on households, particularly the poorer  households. How these 
                                                 
1 Kenya is usually a net importer of maize; in “normal” circumstances, it imports about 2.7 million bags from 
Uganda and Tanzania and it is likely that total imports are generally larger than those reported, because of 
unrecorded trade flows in the region (RATIN 2008). 
2 See Dessus (2008) and Benson (2008) for an impact analysis on Tanzania and Uganda, respectively.  
3 Both Kenya and Tanzania have recently instigated an export ban in order to protect consumers from adverse 
shocks. However, farmers in both countries would have gained from exporting maize as the producer price 
would have been higher. For an analysis of the Tanzanian case, see Dessus (2008). In chapter 3 we present the 
impact of an export ban on the Kenyan market.    4 
 
price changes affect various households in the economy can be quite complex, and in this 
paper we discuss, both from a partial and general equilibrium perspective, the impact of the 
recent price increase on Kenyan households. We also discuss an appropriate policy-mix of 
actions. 
The paper is organised as follows: The next chapter describes and summarises recent 
events in the agricultural sector, with a particular focus on maize in Kenya. The chapter also 
looks at price developments in the maize sector to determine whether they have converged 
over time within regions. The third chapter analyses the impact of the increased maize prices 
with two different methodologies. First, using household survey data, we calculate the Net 
Benefit  Ratios  (NBRs)  across  regions  and  deciles.  Then,  using  a  Computable  General 
Equilibrium (CGE), we simulate the various shocks that have recently occurred in Kenya. The 
final section concludes.  
 
2.  Agricultural performance 
 
Agriculture  is  the  largest  sector  in  the  economy,  generating  a  quarter  of  Kenya’s  gross 
domestic product  (GDP) and two-fifths  of  its  export earnings  (Kiringai et  al.  2006). The 
agricultural sector provides employment to an estimated 70% of the total labour force (KNBS 
2007). Although its performance has improved since 2000, its growth has been mediocre over 
the last two decades. Maize is the most important crop in Kenya, with over 90% of farming 
households growing maize (KNBS 2007). Figure 2.1 illustrates the production of maize in 
Kenya between 1992 and 2008 (metric tonnes). Production is volatile and there is no clear 
trend of improved production. Indeed, peak performance in 2006 is similar to that recorded in 
the late 1980s.
4  
Productivity in the maize sector increased steadily from independence until the 
mid-1980s (Kibaara et al. 2008), but declined between 1985 and 2004. However, Ariga et al. 
(2008) find that maize yields have  improved quite impressively over the 1997-2007 period, 
partly due to  increased use of  fertilizer.
5  Fertilizer marketing costs declined substantially 
between mid 1990s and 2007 but the positive trends in fertilizer use were partially reversed in 
2008 by the civil disruption as well as the surge in global fertiliser prices. 
                                                 
4 See Nyoro et al. (2004) for historical records of maize production in Kenya. 
5 The proportion of farmers using fertiliser on maize in the main growing season has grown from 55% in 1996 to 
70% in 2007 (Ariga et al. 2008), but these rates show considerably variation across the country. The highest 
proportion  (80%)  of  smallholders  using  fertilizer  is  in  Central,  High  Potential  Maize  Zone  and  Western 




   
 
In  the  early  1990s  the  government  partly  liberalised  the  maize  sector  by  eliminating  the 
movement of grain and price control restrictions (Nyoro et al. 2004). Private traders were 
allowed to transport maize across districts and to purchase maize directly from the farmers. 
The National Cereal and Produce Board (NCPB), which previously had been the sole buyer, 
switched from being a near monopoly to becoming the agency to handle the strategic cereal 
reserves. Liberalisation has enabled private sector participation in maize marketing to expand 
significantly.  
Analysing  the  impact  of  the  reform,  Nyoro  et  al.  (2004)  conclude  that 
liberalisation of the domestic market reduced transaction costs in marketing and distribution, 
and increased incentives to traders and marketers. However, government involvement is still 
substantial  with  regard  to  the  NCPB,  which  procures  and  sells  maize  at  administratively 
determined prices, and imposes restrictions on external trade through import duty (normally 
30% but eliminated temporarily in 2008 and 2009) and import quotas on maize. Following the 
crisis in 2008-2009, the government tightened restrictions in the sector by imposing price 
controls, and banning exports and consumer subsidies. 
At the national level, farming contributes approximately 42% of Kenya’s total 
income  and  half  of  the  farm-income  is  derived  from  the  maize  sector  (Table  2.1).  As 6 
 
expected, there is some variation within the different regions. In Western, Nyanza and Rift 
Valley Provinces, more than half of the farm income comes from the maize sector, while in 
Central,  Coastal  and  Eastern  Provinces  its  share  is  around  14%  and  19%,  respectively. 
Farming is less important in other provinces such as North Eastern and Nairobi. 
 
Table 2.1: Source of income across regions (%) 
  National  Nairobi  Central  Coast  Eastern 
North 
Eastern  Nyanza 
Rift 
Valley  Western 
Other  3.3  3.4  2.6  3.0  4.1  4.9  2.9  3.7  3.1 
Labour  47.0  90.6  45.6  62.7  33.9  67.2  36.4  50.1  26.8 
Business  7.7  5.9  5.0  11.7  6.9  19.7  9.4  7.1  6.9 
Farming  42.0  0.1  46.7  22.7  55.2  8.2  51.4  39.2  63.2 
Maize  20.7  0.0  14.1  13.3  19.5  4.2  29.3  23.4  34.4 
Non-
maize  21.3  0.0  32.6  9.4  35.7  4.0  22.1  15.8  28.8 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Author’s calculations using the Kenya Integrated Budget Survey 2005 
 
The share of food in total household expenditures varies across provinces. It is significantly 
lower  in  Nairobi  than  in  other  provinces  where  food  accounts  for  60%-75%  of  total 
expenditures  (Table  2.2).  As  in  other  African  countries,  own  production  is  important  in 
Kenya, with almost 35% of total food consumption being self-produced.  
 
Table 2.2: Food and non-food expenditure shares of total expenditures (%) 
  Nairobi  Central  Coast  Eastern 
North 
Eastern  Nyanza 
Rift 
Valley  Western 
Food expenditures  45.3  60.2  62.5  66.9  75.5  64.0  63.7  67.1 
Subsistence  6.6  24.0  20.6  28.5  21.8  25.7  25.1  28.3 
Maize  3.9  9.1  16.2  17.8  11.4  12.1  12.8  14.3 
Rice  2.1  3.2  2.9  2.1  6.1  1.4  1.9  0.9 
Wheat  0.5  0.5  0.3  0.5  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.1 
Millet  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.7  0.0  1.0  0.8  0.7 
Sorghum  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.5  0.0  1.0  0.2  0.6 
Other cereal  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.3  2.4  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Other food   38.4  46.7  42.9  45.0  55.4  48.4  47.9  50.6 
Non-food expenditures  54.7  39.8  37.5  33.1  24.5  36.0  36.3  32.9 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Source: Author’s calculations using the Kenya Integrated Budget Survey 2005 
 
Own  production  in  Kenya,  however,  is  significantly  less  than  in  Mozambique  where  it 
accounts  for  75%  of  total  food  consumption  (Arndt  et  al.  2008).  With  the  exception  of 
Nairobi, own production accounts for around 40% of total food expenditures in Coast and 7 
 
North Eastern Provinces.
6 Maize, both in terms of subsistence and market-purchased crops, is 
the  most  important  food -crop  in  Kenya  (Table  2.3).  It  dominates  f ood  consumption, 
accounting for 9%-18% of total household expenditures across provinces. In Nairobi the share 
of maize is significantly lower, around 4% of total expenditures. 
 
Table 2.3: Market and subsistence consumption (% of total food expenditures) 
Subsistence consumption (% of total food expenditures) 
  Nairobi  Central  Coast  Eastern 
North 
Eastern  Nyanza 
Rift 
Valley  Western 
Maize  2.1  6.2  9.0  13.8  5.9  10.8  10.2  12.0 
Rice  1.3  0.6  1.0  0.4  1.3  0.3  0.4  0.2 
Wheat  0.8  0.7  0.4  0.5  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.1 
Millet  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.6  0.0  0.8  0.7  0.5 
Sorghum  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.5  0.0  0.8  0.2  0.3 
Other cereal  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.3  2.7  0.0  0.1  0.0 
Other food  11.6  30.3  19.3  25.4  16.8  26.0  26.6  27.9 
Total   16.0  38.2  29.8  41.5  26.9  38.8  38.3  41.0 
Food purchased on the market (% of total food expenditures) 
  Nairobi  Central  Coast  Eastern 
North 
Eastern  Nyanza 
Rift 
Valley  Western 
Maize  6.0  8.2  14.2  11.6  8.8  7.2  8.8  8.9 
Rice  3.4  4.8  4.0  2.9  6.9  2.0  2.7  1.3 
Wheat  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Millet  0.5  0.3  0.2  0.5  0.1  0.8  0.5  0.5 
Sorghum  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.7  0.1  0.5 
Other cereal  0.1  0.3  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Other food  73.9  48.0  51.7  43.0  57.3  50.5  49.4  47.6 
Total   84.0  61.8  70.2  58.5  73.1  61.2  61.7  59.0 
Overall total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Author’s calculations using the Kenya Integrated Budget Survey 2005 
 
The importance of maize in Kenya implies that price changes could have significant impact – 
either positive and negative -- on welfare,. Before analyzing the welfare impact of the surge in 
maize prices, let us look at how maize prices have changed over time. Figure 2.1 shows the 
trend in maize prices (in USD per metric tonnes) between December 2000 and April 2009 in 
Nairobi. During 2001 prices declined, but remained relatively steady between 2003 and 2005. 
In  December  2005  prices  increased,  remaining  stable  until  the  second  half  of  2006.  The 
second half of 2007 witnessed another price hike, which coincided with the increase in the 
global market price of maize. Although prices increased consistently on world markets during 
                                                 
6 Maize produced for market activities has increased over time. The calculations above estimate that 60% of 
maize production is marketed. This is higher than indicated by earlier studies which suggest that approximately 
40% of the maize produced in Kenya is marketed (Friesen and Palmer 2002). 8 
 
two periods: during the later part of 2006 and during the second half of 2007 until March 
2008, domestic maize prices in Kenya, although not affected by the first period, certainly 
were by the second phase (June 2007 to March 2008). Despite the drop in world market prices 
from the first quarter of 2008, prices on the Kenyan market have remained high. 
 
 
Source: RATIN (2008) 
 
How have the recent shocks affected maize prices in different locations within Kenya? Maize 
prices vary between countries due to trade restrictions, and it can be expected that there are 
also  substantial  differences  in  prices  within  a  specific  country.  Markets  may  be  poorly 
coordinated across time and space, and inefficient marketing boards mean that surplus areas 
coexist with deficit areas. This might manifest itself as spatial price differences for the same 
commodity. A comparison of maize prices from December 1993 to April 2009 in Kisumu, 
Mombasa and Nairobi, indicates that with the exception of the early years, price patterns for 
these cities are relatively similar (Figure A2.1 in appendix). The standard deviation of maize 
prices between the three locations initially fell, but has been increasing lately (Figure 2.3). 
This  suggests  that  the  reform  process,  started  in  the  early  1990s  when 
restrictions on the movement of maize across districts were abolished, has had a positive 
impact. But this converging trend has been reversed by the recent crisis: transport services 
between the Western regions (including parts of the maize surplus area of Rift Valley) and the 
rest of Kenya were at a complete standstill. Stocks of maize were looted or destroyed. As a 
result, trade between the regions was reduced, leading to a divergence of maize prices within 
the  country.  Figure  2.4  shows  the  divergence  of  the  standard  deviation  of  maize  prices 9 
 
between the three locations during the first quarter of 2008. Another divergence took place in 









3.  Methodology - Terms of trade shocks and the Impact on the poor 
 
How do changes in the prize of maize impact on the poor? The effect of rising global food 
prices  has  generally  been  estimated  using  two  approaches  (Haq  et  al.  2008).  The  first 
approach considers the impact of increased international food prices on domestic prices using 
price transmission elasticities, and then estimates the impact of domestic food price increases 
on consumer expenditures and/or poverty. An alternative approach is to take the increase in 
domestic food prices as given; that is, higher global prices have already been transmitted to 
the  domestic  economy,  and  then  to  estimate  the  likely  ex  post  impacts  on  poverty.  To 
implement this approach we can either estimate price and income elasticities for disaggregate 
food commodities based on household expenditure data or identify  net producers and net 
consumers. With both methods, we can derive the impact of a domestic price increase on 
households.  Here  we  use  the  latter  approach  where  the  household  analysis  follows  the 
approach  by  Deaton  (1989)  in  that  the  first-order  welfare  impact  of  relative  food  price 
changes is proportional to the net benefit ratio (NBR).  
  The NBR can be interpreted as the elasticity of real income with respect to a 
maize price change. As described by Arndt et al. (2008) the basic model can be represented as 
follows for a single household:    CR PR p w       where ∆p is the maize price change, and 
PR and CR are the maize production and consumption ratios, respectively. The proxy used for 
the production ratio (PR) is the share of the value of maize sales and own production in total 
household income. The proxy used for consumption (CR) is the share of the value of maize 
purchases and own consumption in total household expenditures. Neither technique allows for 
any behavioural change of producers and consumers.  
  However,  fluctuations  in  maize  prices  may  lead  consumers  to  alter  their 
consumption patterns, while producers change their production mix to take advantage of new 
opportunities.  In  order  to  take  into  account  these  indirect  effects  of  a  shock,  we  use  a 
computable general equilibrium model developed for the Kenyan economy to evaluate the 
impact. The model used in this paper is described in detail in Thurlow et al. (2008). It is a 
standard  dynamic  neo-classical  model  calibrated  to  a  highly  disaggregated  2002  social 
accounting matrix (SAM) that distinguishes between 212 productive activities (53 sectors in 
four sub-national regions) and 53 commodities. It is a spatial model and includes the three 
main agro-ecological zones (lowlands, midlands, and highlands) and the major metropolitan 
areas.  The  CGE  model  is  linked  to  a  micro-simulation  module  where  standard  poverty 
measures are estimated. The base year of the model is 2002 and is run over two periods of 11 
 
time,  representing  here  2007-2008.  The  model  captures  import  competition  and  export 
opportunities by allowing producers and consumers to shift between domestic and foreign 
markets depending on the fluctuating relative prices.  
   
3.1 Impact analysis based on survey data 
 
Higher maize prices would, ceteris paretus, have a positive impact on household that are net 
sellers of maize. However, net buyer households would be hurt, as wages are not adjusted 
immediately. Using data based on Tegemeo’s household surveys, Jayne et al. (2000) classify 
farmers based on their marketing position, i.e., whether they were net buyers or net sellers of 
maize. They find that a large number of small-scale farm households are net buyers of maize 
and would, consequently, be hurt in the short-term by higher prices. For example, of the 
small-scale  farm  households  surveyed  in  districts  of  the  Western  Lowlands  and  Eastern 
Lowlands, 82 and 66% were net buyers of maize. The main region where higher maize prices 
clearly help small-scale farmers is in the High-Potential Maize Zone, where roughly 70% of 
the households sell maize. Jayne et al. (2005) also observe that the maize-selling households 
have  annual  per  capita  incomes  almost  double  that  of  the  maize-buying  households.  A 
tentative conclusion, then, is that shocks or policies which would hike up maize prices would 
benefit a small proportion of the relatively rich rural Kenyans, but a large share of the urban 
and rural population would suffer. 
  In  this  study  we  focus  on  both  producers  and  consumers,  using  the  latest 
household budget survey: Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS). Table 3.1 
shows the population shares of net buyers and net sellers across the Kenyan provinces. More 
than half of the population (54.9%) have a NBR below zero, indicating that quite a number of 
households  would  suffer  a  loss  of  welfare  as  a  result  of  increased  maize  prices. 
Approximately  95%  of  households  located  in  Nairobi  have  a  benefit  ratio  below  zero, 
indicative  again  of  the  fact  that  increased  maize  prices  would  be  felt  by  most  of  the 
households in Nairobi. A large part of the populations in Coastal and Northern Provinces have 
a negative NBR.  
  On average, the net benefit ratio is negative or low for Nairobi, Central, Coastal, 
Eastern and North Eastern Provinces. Nyanza, Rift Valley and Western are  the provinces 
where a high share of households exhibits a positive net benefit ratio, as well as a relatively 
higher  mean,  implying  that,  on  average,  households  in  these  regions  would  gain  from 
increased producer prices on maize.  On average, a 100% increase in  maize prices  would 12 
 
reduce,  in  the  short  term,  real  incomes  in  Nairobi  and  the  Coast  by  3.2%  and  1.8%, 
respectively. But a price increase of the same magnitude would raise real incomes in Nyanza, 
Rift Valley and Western Provinces by almost 20%, based on the assumption, of course, that 
the increase is passed onto both the producers and consumers. The last scenario (fifth column) 
assumes  that  producer  prices  do  not  adjust  so  that  the  price  shock  is  felt  only  on  the 
expenditure side. This short-term scenario reduces the NBR further, but Nyanza, Rift Valley 
and Western Provinces  will still, on average, have a positive NBR. Overall real incomes 
would drop by 2.6%, but incomes in Nyanza, Rift Valley and Western would still increase. 
Coastal and Eastern Provinces would experience significant decline in income. The critical 
question is whether or not incomes in Kenya  adjusted during the price hike. Höffler and 
Ochieng (2008) argue that price increases were passed onto farmers late in 2008, but as some 
smallholders had perhaps already sold their crops earlier, they missed out on the benefit from 
increased producer prices. It is difficult to establish the “actual” impact, but it would perhaps 
fall between the two “extreme” scenarios outlined above. 
 
Table 3.1: Net benefit ratio – maize (%) 
 
Share of population 
NBR<0  NBR  NBR income effect 
NBR no incomes 
effect 
Nairobi  94.5  -3.2  -6.5  -6.9 
Central  60.4  4.6  9.2  -4.5 
Coast  75.2  -1.8  -3.7  -17.5 
Eastern  59.0  1.1  2.2  -16.4 
North Eastern  76.8  4.2  8.4  -5.5 
Nyanza  35.7  17.7  35.4  5.7 
Rift Valley  52.2  17.2  34.3  4.9 
Western  33.8  20.8  41.5  6.6 
Total  54.9  10.0  20.0  -2.6 
Source: Author’s calculations using the Kenya Integrated Budget Survey 2005 
The impact of higher maize prices might hurt the poor disproportionately. Table 3.2 shows the 
NBR across deciles and provinces. In Nairobi, Coastal and Eastern Provinces the low-income 
groups have a higher (negative) NBR than households in the higher deciles, indicating that 
poor households would be hurt by a price increase. But the pattern is less clear in regions with 
a higher NBR. For example in Nyanza, even the poorer groups have a relatively high NBR, 
while in Rift Valley the first deciles have the lowest NBR. The first income decile in Coastal 
Province could be seriously affected. Overall, it is the middle-income households that have 
the  largest  NBR.  These  results  are  based  on  the  assumption  that  price  changes  are 
immediately passed on to both consumers and producers. 13 
 
Table 3.2: Net benefit ratio – maize (%) 
    Deciles 
  Total  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Nairobi  -3.2  -13.4  -17.0  -10.7  -7.5  -9.4  -8.1  -5.7  -4.4  -3.7  -1.0 
Central  4.6  14.4  3.1  7.7  3.3  4.0  4.8  2.9  3.0  3.4  4.6 
Coast  -1.8  -20.5  -2.9  -1.6  9.6  3.4  4.0  3.5  -0.8  -0.4  -1.2 
Eastern  1.1  -6.6  -8.2  -5.3  0.1  4.4  5.3  9.0  9.8  6.0  1.7 
North Eastern  4.2  1.8  13.1  6.6  -1.4  0.3  37.2  -5.1  -1.5  -3.0  -1.6 
Nyanza  17.7  22.5  17.7  21.6  22.2  22.7  18.7  14.7  14.9  14.1  4.5 
Rift Valley  17.2  6.8  17.5  24.5  22.5  22.8  19.6  20.9  14.5  9.8  8.7 
Western  20.8  14.5  21.5  25.4  23.2  14.9  24.0  23.9  22.7  17.3  15.2 
Total  10.0  4.8  10.0  12.9  14.5  12.8  13.0  13.1  10.2  5.9  2.8 
Source: Author’s calculations using the Kenya Integrated Budget Survey 2005 
 
Table 3.3 shows the impact of a 100% increase in maize prices on the NBR based on the 
assumption  that  the  price  shock  applies  to  consumer  prices  only.  In  Nairobi  the  NBR 
increases approximately 100% across the deciles, as city households’ income from maize is 
minimal. However, in some regions, such as Coastal and Eastern, and in some income groups, 
the NBR increases quite dramatically, reflecting the importance of maize in the consumption 
basket. This means that welfare losses could be significantly more severe across households 
in the lower deciles.   
   
Table 3.3: Net benefit ratio of maize - only expenditures adjust (%) 
    Deciles 
ssmNBR  Total  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Nairobi  -6.9  -26.7  -33.9  -21.5  -15.1  -19.0  -16.3  -11.3  -8.7  -7.4  -2.8 
Central  -4.5  -0.6  -12.1  -5.9  -9.2  -7.0  -5.9  -5.3  -3.3  -0.8  1.9 
Coast  -17.5  -54.3  -26.9  -25.2  -7.6  -14.5  -7.1  -4.3  -7.1  -4.0  -3.7 
Eastern  -16.4  -35.3  -36.3  -26.7  -19.9  -13.6  -7.9  -2.2  -0.2  -1.0  -2.3 
North Eastern  -5.5  -12.9  -3.4  -1.4  -13.6  -6.7  29.5  -10.1  -5.2  -6.0  -3.2 
Nyanza  5.7  4.4  0.7  6.6  8.6  8.6  6.7  5.9  6.0  7.8  0.3 
Rift Valley  4.9  -14.7  -1.1  9.1  9.3  10.0  9.5  11.1  6.9  3.4  5.3 
Western  6.6  -4.4  4.5  9.0  9.2  2.2  12.1  10.8  12.8  7.7  10.9 
Total  -2.6  -18.0  -10.1  -4.5  -0.3  -1.3  1.8  3.4  2.3  0.4  0.0 
Source: Author’s calculations using the Kenya Integrated Budget Survey 2005 
 
As  noted  in  other  studies,  it  seems  that  the  impact  is  particularly  severe  on  the  poorer 
households  (i.e.,  those  in  the  lower  income  deciles).  In  order  to  obtain  some  poverty 
estimates, we scale up real incomes (approximated by per adult equivalent expenditures) with 
the welfare change derived above. In the poverty scenario, it is assumed that maize prices 
increase 100%. In addition, we assume various degrees of windfall (producer) gains: in the 14 
 
first scenario, windfall gains are zero and in the final scenario, the price effect is passed, in 
total, on to the producers. Between these poles, windfall gains are assumed to be a fraction of 
the price increase.  
 
Table 3.4: Urban poverty impact of 100% increase in maize prices 
    Windfall gains (%) 
    0  20  40  60  80  100 
  Base  Headcount ratio (basic need) 
Nairobi  20.3  23.0  23.0  23.0  23.0  23.0  23.0 
Central  30.9  34.5  34.4  33.9  32.4  31.7  30.8 
Coast  38.8  43.2  43.2  43.2  43.2  43.2  42.9 
Eastern  33.3  37.5  37.4  37.3  36.3  36.3  36.0 
North Eastern  73.8  77.3  77.3  77.3  77.3  77.3  77.3 
Nyanza  39.8  46.1  44.8  44.3  43.4  42.0  42.0 
Rift Valley  42.0  49.1  48.6  48.4  48.0  47.6  47.4 
Western  53.6  57.5  56.1  54.8  53.9  53.1  50.6 
Total  32.9  37.2  36.9  36.7  36.3  36.0  35.8 
Source: Author’s calculations using the Kenya Integrated Budget Survey 2005 
 
Overall, urban poverty increases due to the price mark-up on maize, and the headcount ratio 
increases by 3 to almost 4.5 percentage units, depending on how much of the price hike is 
transmitted to the producers (Table 3.4). The effect is quite large, considering that we are 
looking at maize only. As the urban population is less dependent on maize as an income 
source, as consumers they are mostly hurt. This is particularly true in Nairobi, Coast, Eastern 
and North Eastern provinces. The income effect does matter in other provinces and with the 
exception of Western, all provinces experience increased urban food poverty as a result of the 
price shock.  
What is the distributional effect of the price shock? Figure 3.1 presents a set of 
incidence curves measuring changes in per capita incomes (on the vertical axis) and ranking 
(on the horizontal axis) households from the poorest (left-hand side) to the richest (right-hand 
side). Again  we include the assumed windfall gains and  almost  all urban households are 
negatively affected, except the richest deciles. But as a higher percentage of the price mark-up 
is passed on to producers, rural poverty is reduced because those who become poor in the first 
scenario are now in a better position. It is the poorest households that experience the largest 





As would be expected, the income effect is more pronounced in the rural than the urban areas. 
Assuming  that  the  price  shock  is  passed  through  in  total  (100%),  the  headcount  ratio  is 
reduced by almost 8 percentage units (Table 3.5). The largest reduction would be in Nyanza, 
Rift Valley and Western provinces. Even with the assumption of a 60% pass-through effect, 
poverty increases in Central and Eastern Provinces. However, if the higher prices are not 
passed through, rural poverty would increase quite significantly in Central, Coast and Eastern 
provinces. It is important to note is that there is a spatial distinction within the provinces. For 
example, regardless of the level of producer prices being passed through to the farmers, rural 
poverty is reduced while urban poverty increases in Nyanza.  
 
Table 3.5: Rural poverty impact of 100% increase in maize prices  
    Income adjustments (%) 
  Base  0  20  40  60  80  100 
Central  29.8  35.2  34.2  33.2  31.7  30.9  29.5 
Coast  68.6  73.8  71.7  70.9  68.8  67.7  66.4 
Eastern  50.5  57.0  55.2  53.7  52.1  50.7  49.2 
North Eastern  72.0  72.6  71.3  71.3  70.0  68.4  67.7 
Nyanza  47.5  46.0  43.3  41.0  38.6  36.4  34.6 
Rift Valley  47.7  43.1  41.1  40.2  38.5  37.2  36.1 
Western  53.5  50.6  47.9  44.4  42.2  40.4  38.2 
Total  48.1  48.7  46.7  45.0  43.1  41.7  40.2 




Source: Own calculations 
 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the distributional impact for the rural areas. The incidence curve shows 
that, as in the urban areas, the reduction in per capita incomes is the highest for the poorest of 
the poor. The cut-off point on the vertical axis (0.0) indicates the level of per capita income at 
which households are neutral to the price shock. Households on the left-hand side of the cut-
off point lose while those on the right-hand side gain. Note that as the windfall gain increases 
(moving from 0% to 100%), the point where the incidence curves cut the axis moves to the 
left. This means that a higher pass-through effect also benefits individuals at lower income 
levels, which means falling poverty levels. Nevertheless, even with a 100% pass-through of 
the price increase to farmers, the poorest households will be faced with declining incomes.  
 
3.2 Impact based on general equilibrium analysis 
 
  As discussed in chapter 1, the Kenyan economy has lately been confronted by several internal 
and external shocks. Here we try to capture how these shocks have influenced the Kenyan 
economy.  As  income  and  expenditure  patterns  vary  considerably  across  households,  we 
would expect the shocks to affect households differently. The impact on rural households 
would  differ  from  those  of  the  urban  households  but,  as  can  be  expected,  also  the 
consequences on households within the rural areas would be different, as was noted above. 
Table 3.6 outlines the various shock scenarios as well as some selected policy scenarios. 
    The base scenario assumes that the economy is growing at an average rate of 4% 
during 2007-2008, which is approximately equivalent to the actual average growth during 
2007 and 2008. Agriculture in the baseline scenario expands at around 4%, as food crops 17 
 
increase more slowly than cash crops and livestock. Manufacturing and the service sectors are 
assumed to grow at approximately 4%. While the economy grows at 4% per year, household 
consumption  expenditure  rises  by  4.2%  per  year  or  2.3%  in  per  capita  terms.  Under  the 
baseline scenario, headcount poverty falls from 49.7% to 46.5% in the rural areas and from 
34.5% to 33.8% in the urban areas.  
The  next  three  scenarios  focus  on  the  recent  price  fluctuations.  The  second 
scenario looks at the impact of the increased world market (export) price of maize; the third 
scenario captures a price shock resulting from an adverse maize output development in the 
Kenyan  economy,  while  the  fourth  scenario  evaluates  the  impact  of  an  adverse  shock  in 
fertiliser prices.  
 
Table 3.6: Shock and policy scenarios 
Shock scenarios    Details 
1.  Base scenario   Average GDP growth of 4.1% 
2.  Price shock in the maize sector (WMS)  World market on exported price increases by 100% 
3.  Price shock in the maize sector (DMS)  Price shock due to domestic shock 
4.  Fertiliser price shock (FS)  World market price on fertiliser increases by 100% 
Policy scenarios    
5.  Productivity improvements in the maize 
sector (PROD+)  Productivity increasing 
6.  Changes in marketing margins, domestic 
(MM)  Marketing margins reduced by 80% in the agricultural sector 
7.  Export ban (EXB)  Export tax on maize introduced removing exports 
8.  Import liberalisation (TLIB)  Import duties on maize removed 
9.  Tax reduction on fuel (TFU)  Fuel taxes reduced  
10.  Tax reduction on fertiliser (TFE)  Fertiliser subsidy across agric. Sectors 
 
The remaining scenario evaluates the impact of the different policy reforms targeted mainly to 
the maize sector  but also in some instances to entire agricultural sector. Our fifth scenario 
evaluates the impact of productivity improvements in the maize sector. Scenario six examines 
the  impact  of  reduced  marketing  margins  in  the  agricultural  sector ,
7  while the seventh 
scenario simulates the introduction of an export ban in the maize sector. The eighth sc enario 
considers the removal of import duties on maize, and the ninth and tenth scenarios review the 
impact of removing domestic commodity taxes on fuel and fertiliser.  
Before we go into the actual results let us clarify what we expect from an 
economy-wide general equilibrium model. First, changes in relative prices in a CGE model 
                                                 
7 A reduction in marketing margins is modeled as a reduction in the input use of the marketing services. As such 
it will also affect the trading sector which supplies the service.  18 
 
are  the  key  signal  affecting  both  producers  and  consumers.  For  example,  in  the  second 
scenario where world market (export) prices increase significantly, this spills-over into the 
domestic market and has a positive impact on producer prices to the benefit of the farmers, 
provided that markets can deliver the inputs needed for increased production. In the third 
scenario, higher producer prices for maize are the result of a significant adverse output shock 
in  the  maize  market.  While  the  first  scenario  captures  the  impact  of  higher  prices  in  an 
environment  of  good  policy  and  adequate  rainfall,  the  second  scenario  is  a  more  likely 
outcome in crisis or drought circumstances. 
In both scenarios, from the consumer point of view there is a substitution effect 
and an income effect. Higher price for maize implies that consumers switch to other food 
products. Higher prices also reduce real incomes, reducing demand in turn. From a producer 
point of view, higher prices are an incentive to increase production. If, however, costs of 
intermediate inputs increase, the value added is reduced, becoming a disincentive to expand 
supply. The model also considers inter-sectoral linkages, which imply that reduced supply in 
one sector might affect other sectors as well. With regard to trade, reform that cuts import 
duties  would  reduce  the  price  on  imported  substitutes,  and  thus  encourage  consumers  to 
switch from domestically produced goods to imported goods. The model allows for imperfect 




In the second simulation (WMS), a favourable terms-of-trade shock would benefit the maize 
sector and GDP growth would increase to 5.7% compared to the 4.1% baseline growth (Table 
3.7). As producer prices increase, it would benefit farmers both in terms of the higher value of 
existing sales but also provide incentives to expand production in the second period. Land and 
labour would be allocated to the maize sector and production would increase.  Consumers 
would substitute the relatively more expensive maize for other food products such as wheat 
and rice. As the real  exchange rate appreciates  after the favourable terms-of-trade  shock, 
imported food products become cheaper, lowering prices on non-maize food products. In this 
case, both urban and rural household benefit from higher export prices on maize. Poverty is 





Table 3.7: Baseline Scenario Macro-economic Developments 
    Shock scenarios  Policy scenarios 
Variables  Base  WMS  DMS  FS  PROD+  MM  EXB  TLIB  TFU  TFE 
GDP  4.1  5.7  2.7  2.9  5.9  3.9  4.1  4.1  4.4  4.3 
Agriculture  3.9  7.5  -0.2  0.4  9.9  5.7  3.8  3.8  4.0  4.6 
Staple crops  3.0  20.2  -13.3  -1.2  27.8  4.8  2.9  2.9  3.0  3.7 
Cash crops  4.4  -2.2  4.2  0.8  4.4  6.1  4.4  4.4  4.9  5.3 
Other agric.  3.0  4.1  3.1  2.5  2.8  4.1  3.0  3.0  3.1  3.1 
Manufacturing  4.3  2.9  3.7  4.7  4.5  5.7  4.3  4.3  4.9  4.3 
Food  5.0  4.1  3.4  5.0  5.7  7.1  5.0  5.0  5.2  5.0 
Light mfg.  4.0  2.7  3.9  4.5  4.1  5.5  4.1  4.0  5.2  4.0 
Heavy mfg.  3.9  2.1  3.9  4.5  4.0  4.6  3.9  3.9  4.2  3.9 
Other 
industries  4.0  5.1  3.8  3.5  4.1  4.3  4.0  4.0  4.5  4.1 
Private 
services  4.3  6.2  3.5  3.4  4.9  2.1  4.3  4.3  4.6  4.3 
Public 
services  4.0  4.4  4.0  3.8  4.0  4.1  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0 
Producer price 
of maize  1.3  51.9  104.8  6.3  -47.2  5.3  1.1  0.8  1.4  0.5 
Consumer 
price of maize  1.3  50.4  101.4  6.1  -45.6  2.5  1.1  0.9  1.4  0.6 
Poverty (headcount 
ratio)                   
Urban areas  33.8  30.8  36.7  34.9  30.7  34.4  33.8  33.8  33.1  33.8 
Rural areas  46.5  34.3  45.0  50.8  46.7  42.6  46.5  46.5  46.9  45.9 
Total urban (% change 
compared to base)  -8.6  8.6  3.4  -8.9  1.8  0.1  0.0  0.1  -3.5 
Nairobi    -1.4  11.9  1.3  -8.0  -1.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.6 
Central    -10.5  14.3  13.3  -2.2  14.5  0.0  0.0  0.4  -3.9 
Coast    -10.1  7.5  1.2  -12.8  -2.4  0.0  0.0  -0.2  -4.1 
Eastern    -16.6  5.9  6.6  -7.5  5.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  -7.2 
North Eastern    -10.0  5.2  4.9  -4.5  7.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -2.7 
Nyanza    -4.8  7.0  2.3  -8.8  3.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  -2.9 
Rift Valley    -14.1  7.6  4.5  -10.9  1.8  0.3  0.0  0.6  -6.7 
Western    -13.1  5.6  4.6  -6.6  7.1  0.6  0.6  -0.1  -6.8 
Total rural (% change 
compared to base)  -26.3  -3.2  9.3  0.4  -8.2  0.0  0.0  -1.3  -9.4 
Central    -32.1  -7.1  15.0  1.0  -11.6  0.0  0.0  -2.5  -16.1 
Coast    -21.7  -4.8  6.9  -0.3  -8.5  0.0  0.0  -2.5  -8.2 
Eastern    -27.5  -3.5  10.0  1.5  -8.1  0.2  0.2  -0.9  -6.9 
North Eastern    -17.3  0.0  3.0  3.3  -3.6  0.2  0.2  0.0  -1.5 
Nyanza    -30.0  -1.7  4.9  -1.5  -8.6  0.0  0.0  -0.7  -5.5 
Rift Valley    -24.0  -1.4  13.6  -0.4  -7.1  0.0  0.0  -1.7  -13.4 
Western    -27.7  -5.5  5.9  1.4  -9.6  0.0  0.0  -0.8  -9.2 
Source: Own scenarios 
 
The third scenario looks at the impact of an adverse domestic supply shock (DMS). The 
adverse shock generates almost a 100% increase in consumer prices, as the supply of maize in 
all  regions  (lowland,  midland  and  highlands)  is  reduced.  However,  as  prices  increase 
dramatically, this might compensate for the reduction in supply, and does not necessarily 
reduce incomes. Significantly hit are the urban households that have to cope with higher 20 
 
prices. Even if they switch from maize to other food products, it is not total substitution 
(100%), because the alternatives are imperfect substitutes.  
The impact of the price shock reduces  rural poverty by 1.5 percentage units 
(compared to the base scenario) but increases urban poverty by 3.1 percentage units. The 
results -- both in the urban and the rural cases -- are along the same lines as in the partial 
analysis discussed above. Increased world market price for fertiliser would have a significant 
impact on the Kenyan agrarian economy (FS scenario). Two important factors here are the 
significantly increasing use of fertiliser over the last few years,
8 and the lack of a  locally 
produced substitute for chemical fertiliser. Here we simulate a 100% increase in fertilis er 
prices  across agricultural sectors. Compared to the baseline, GDP growth would be 2.8 
percentage units lower.  Because we simulate higher  fertiliser prices across all  agricultural 
sectors, the impact is rather significant and poverty increas es in both urban and rural areas. 
Specifically, the urban areas of the Central Province would witness high growth in poverty, as 
would the rural areas such as Central, Rift Valley and Eastern Provinces.  
What are the distributional effects of the shocks? A set of growt h-incidence 
curves is derived from the micro-simulation module linked to the CGE model. With regard to 
the shock scenarios,  Figure  3.3  illustrates the change in real per capita expenditures per 
income centiles. An export price shock would be favourable to most households, particularly 
the low- and median income households, whereas a fertiliser price shock would hurt the same 
households more than the rich ones. Although a domestic shock has a less dramatic impact, it 
would have an adverse (neutral) outcome on income distribution in urban (rural) areas (Figure 
A3.1-A3.2). 
In the last six scenarios we examine some policy measures that could be seen as 
counteractive to some of the shocks discussed above. The fifth scenario reviews the impact of 
a productivity increase in the maize sector  (PROD+). Here it is assumed to be a costless 
productivity shock, so that it can be perceived as being “manna from heaven”. Overall, higher 
productivity in the maize sector induces positive results: GDP and output of maize increase 
significantly. Nevertheless, the boost in supply also reduces the price of maize, to the benefit 
of the urban households who see a reduction in poverty. For the rural poor there is not much 
change with regard to poverty compared to the base scenario. Some regions are adversely 
affected by the productivity shock, and compared to the baseline scenario, poverty increases 
                                                 
8 Use of fertiliser has been increasing over the years. As reported from the latest household budget survey 
(KIBS) fertiliser was applied on 69 % of parcels of land. Inorganic fertiliser is more prevalent than organic 
fertiliser. 21 
 
in Coastal, Eastern, North Eastern and Western provinces. Productivity improvements in the 
agriculture sector, and particularly in the maize sector, are important but this scenario also 
shows that agricultural growth alone is not the key to sustained development process. Other 




Alternatively, efforts to encourage exports of maize could keep producer prices at a higher 
level,  to  the  benefit  of  the  farmers.  However,  in  responding  to  the  crisis,  the  Kenyan 
government did the opposite, and introduced an export ban. As exports in the base year are 
rather small, we would not expect any major change. What can be expected, however, is that 
the  producer  price  decreases,  as  more  maize  is  supplied  to  the  domestic  market.  The 
ramifications would be negative for the producers and positive for the consumers. The export 
ban scenario shows that the maize supply is lower than in the baseline scenario, and reduced 
producer prices for maize encourage the shift to other agricultural products. Thus, in a longer 
term-perspective, an export ban would hurt the maize sector.  
  More trade could reduce the volatility in maize prices in the East Africa region. 
Ideally, we would like to simulate a trade reform in the maize sector across East Africa but 
that  would  require  a  regional  model  or  three  separate  linked  national  models.  Here  we 
consider total liberalisation of import duties on maize, in that the Kenyan Government would 
abolish  import  duties  and  allow  free  access  for  any  dealer  to  import  maize.
9  Complete 
                                                 
9 In 2008 at the height of the food-crisis the Government still administratively allocated import licenses to 
various millers allowing them to import maize subject to import duties. Early in 2009 the government abolished 
import duties but only a certain quota can be imported.  22 
 
removal of import duties on maize would reduce its price and increase imports. However, as 
domestically produced maize and imported maize are not perfect substitutes, the impact is not 
dramatic.
10  Some  reduction in domestic  production will occur,  but it will not have any 
significant impact on poverty.  
Another policy option to support the agricultural sector is to implement reforms 
which would reduce marketing margins.  In  looking  at  the impact of reduced (domestic) 
marketing margins on the agriculture sector as a whole , we  assume that the input of  the 
transaction services needed in this sector is reduced, which could be seen as an approximation 
of reduced prices of the service.  The impact of  lower  margins has  a  positive  result  on 
agricultural  performance, benefitting both staple -  and cash crop sectors.  As the  supplied 
services, such as transport, usually  originate from  the urban areas, reduced demand would 
affect urban households negatively. Compared to the base scenario , poverty increases in the 
urban areas while  in the rural areas,  it decreases. Rural poverty is reduced across regions, 
while urban poverty is significantly increased in Central, North Eastern and Western regions.  
The  distributional  impact  of  the  policy  scenarios  above  is  examined  with 
growth-incidence curves (Figure 3.4-3.6). From a national perspective, polic ies that reduce 
marketing margins are progressive. Productivity improvements have a negative impact on the 
lower tail and offer the greatest benefits to the richer households. Elimination of fertiliser and 
fuel taxes has no major impact on income distribution. 
Distributional outcome, however, can be quite different in urban and rural areas. 
For example, a positive productivity shock benefits the lower tail of urban households more 
than the richer households (Figure 3. 5). The removal of a fuel tax has a posi tive effect on 
incomes and is distributed equally. But policies that reduce marketing margins are regressive, 
reducing incomes at the lower tail.  
The distributional impact in the rural areas is different (Figure 3.6). A reduction 
in marketing margins would benefit poorer households  relatively more than the richer ones. 
With regard to productivity, the poorest households are hurt  relatively more than middle-
income households. Removing fertiliser tax and fuel taxes  does not seem to have a major 
impact on income distribution, but the overall results point to the important issue that policy 
reforms do affect income distribution  differently, depending whether households are located 
in urban or rural areas. 
 
                                                 








An  important  policy  consideration  is  the  introduction  of  fertiliser  subsidies.  Arndt  et  al. 
(2008) argue that a reduction in fuel taxes in the case of Mozambique would be better option 
for supporting farmers than specific measures targeted to the agriculture sector itself. In the 
case of Kenya, it seems that a fertiliser subsidy is the more cost-effective option in terms of 
lost government revenue and its impact on poverty eradication. This conclusion is drawn from 
a set of fuel and fertiliser tax scenarios, which include the results of sixteen different tax 
reduction options (Table 3.8). In both the fuel and fertiliser tax scenarios, the initial tax (17%) 
is reduced first by 10% and then by a subsequent 25% for each scenario
11 so that the tax is 
eliminated in the fourth scenario and a subsidy provided in the subsequent scenarios.  
At the national level a fertiliser subsidy has a more pronounced impact on 
national poverty than a fuel subsidy at a given cost. It also seems that the marginal impact  of 
an additional fuel (fertiliser) subsidy on poverty is low (high). The impact on rural poverty 
follows the same pattern. The effect is the reverse with regard to urban poverty . In urban 






                                                 
11 Fertiliser is zero-rated with regard to the value added tax (VAT). In order to capture the impact of fertiliser 
subsidies we have introduced an indirect tax on fertiliser. In our base scenario the tax rate is set at 17%. 
12 In all tax scenarios a revenue neutral reform is assumed where direct taxes are adjusted. 25 
 
Table 3.8: Poverty impact of reduced commodity taxes on fuel and fertiliser 
  % change in headcount ratio (compared to initial)     
  Rural  Urban  National  Tax revenue (real) 
Tax 
rate  Fuel   Fertiliser  Fuel  Fertiliser  Fuel  Fertiliser  Fuel  Fertiliser 
18  -6.5  -6.5  -2.3  -2.3  -5.9  -5.9  109.0  109.0 
13  -6.3  -6.9  -2.5  -2.3  -5.7  -6.2  101.6  107.4 
9  -6.1  -7.3  -3.3  -2.2  -5.7  -6.5  94.7  105.9 
4  -5.9  -7.5  -4.1  -2.1  -5.7  -6.7  88.4  104.7 
0  -5.7  -7.7  -4.3  -2.2  -5.5  -6.9  82.3  103.4 
-4  -5.8  -7.9  -4.5  -2.2  -5.6  -7.1  76.7  102.3 
-9  -5.6  -8.1  -4.6  -2.2  -5.5  -7.3  71.4  101.3 
-13  -5.5  -8.3  -4.9  -1.5  -5.4  -7.3  66.4  100.3 
-18  -5.1  -8.3  -5.5  -1.3  -5.2  -7.3  61.6  99.5 
-22  -5.0  -8.6  -5.6  -1.3  -5.1  -7.5  57.1  98.7 
-26  -4.9  -8.9  -5.8  -1.2  -5.0  -7.7  52.8  97.9 
-31  -4.8  -9.1  -6.9  -1.3  -5.1  -7.9  48.7  97.2 
-35  -4.9  -9.2  -7.4  -1.3  -5.3  -8.0  44.8  96.5 
-39  -4.9  -9.4  -7.4  -1.3  -5.3  -8.2  41.0  95.8 
-44  -4.9  -9.6  -7.4  -1.2  -5.2  -8.4  37.3  95.2 
-48  -4.9  -9.8  -7.9  -1.3  -5.4  -8.5  33.9  94.7 
Source: Own scenarios 
 
Conclusion 
The  recent  hike  in  food  prices  has  been  of  great  concern  to  policymakers,  international 
organisations and donor agencies. A number of studies have looked at the impact of escalating 
food prices in developing countries and found that urban poverty will generally increase in the 
short term. Also, the rural poor might be affected negatively in the short term but the impact 
might revert to positive in the longer term.  
  Kenya has been faced by both external and internal shocks and it seems that the 
domestic shocks have had a significant impact on the maize sector. Maize prices started to 
diverge early in 2008 between the different regions, as a result of a complete standstill in 
transport services between the Western parts of Kenya and the rest of the country. As a result 
trade among the regions was reduced, which led to a divergence in prices of maize within 
Kenya.  
  Higher maize prices do have  a significant welfare impact on the population, 
causing  more  than  half  of  the  Kenyans  to  suffer  welfare  losses.  In  Nairobi,  Coastal  and 
Northern Provinces, a large part of the population are net buyers and are experience a loss in 
welfare. Moreover, in Nairobi, Coastal and Eastern Provinces low-income households would 
be disproportionately hurt by a price increase. The simulations indicate that welfare in other 26 
 
regions would increase if maize producers were able to capture the windfall gains from higher 
prices. But simulating a 100% increase in maize prices with no windfall gains indicates that 
welfare  could  deteriorate  quite  significantly  among  households  in  Nairobi,  Coastal  and 
Eastern provinces.  
  In terms of food poverty, different scenarios were simulated based on different 
windfall gains ranging from 0 to 100%. Overall, urban food poverty increases by 7-10%, 
depending on how much producers gain from marked-up prices. The effect is quite large 
when considering the fact that we are looking at maize only. Regardless of whether farmers 
benefit  from  the  windfall  gains,  urban  poverty  would  increase  in  all  provinces,  with  the 
exception of Central and Western provinces. As would be expected, the income effect is more 
prominent in the rural than the urban areas. Assuming that the price shock in total is passed 
through to the farmers, food poverty in rural areas is reduced by almost 14%, with the largest 
reductions in Nyanza, Rift Valley and Western provinces. However, Eastern Province, even 
when assuming complete income adjustments, faces a 10% increase in rural food poverty. If 
incomes are not passed through, rural food poverty increases quite significantly in Central, 
Coast and Eastern provinces.  
  In a general equilibrium framework, we find that after a domestic price shock on 
maize, poverty is reduced by almost 3% in the rural areas but increases in the urban areas by 
close to 9%. Although the results are similar to those in the partial analysis discussed above, 
magnitudes differ. The impact of a price shock resulting from improvements in the terms of 
trade would be favourable for both the urban and rural populations. The rural population is 
better off, because maize prices increase, but the urban population substitutes to other food 
commodities. This means declining prices as the exchange rate appreciates, which makes 
imported food products cheaper.    
  Several other shocks have recently hit the Kenyan economy and the impact of 
these shocks can be quite significant. For example, increased world market price for fertiliser 
could  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  Kenyan  agrarian  economy.  In  simulating  a  100% 
increase in fertiliser price across agricultural sectors, we find that the effect on poverty is 
quite significant, and would apply to both urban and rural areas.  
  Total removal of import duties on maize would reduce its price and increase 
imports. However, as domestically produced maize is not a perfect substitute for imported 
maize, the impact is not dramatic. Some reduction in domestic production will occur and 
poverty in rural areas will increase slightly but to varying degrees across regions. Coastal and 
Eastern Provinces would be negatively affected while Rift Valley could benefit.   27 
 
  In the longer term productivity has to  be increased in the agriculture sector. 
Higher productivity in the maize sector has overall positive results: GDP increases and output 
of maize expands significantly. But the boost in supply also reduces the price of maize, which 
is  a  good  outcome  for  urban  households  but  bad  for  the  rural  areas.  This  illustrates  the 
importance of a broad-based strategy in which increased demand can keep prices at a level 
that benefits both urban and rural households. 
A more important policy consideration is the introduction of fertiliser subsidies. 
A  subsidy  has  a  positive  impact  on  both  staple  and  cash-crop  sectors,  and  poverty  is 
significantly  reduced  in  the  rural  areas,  but  this  depends  on  the  efficient  and  transparent 
delivery of inputs. An alternative policy would be to reduce fuel taxes to reduce the cost of 
diesel and petroleum used as input in both agriculture and non-agriculture activities. In the 
Kenya case, it seems that a fertiliser subsidy is the more cost-effective option. At the national 
level  a  fertiliser  subsidy  has  a  more  pronounced  impact  on  national  poverty  than  a  fuel 
subsidy at a given cost. It also seems that the marginal impact of an additional fuel (fertiliser) 
subsidy on rural poverty is low (high). The opposite effect is true for urban poverty. While 
urban poverty would increase from a fertiliser subsidy, the fuel subsidy here has a significant 
effect on poverty reduction. 
What  becomes  evident  from  the  scenarios  above  is  the  observation  that  a 
package of reforms that decreases marketing margins in conjunction with reduced fertiliser 
prices would be important for stimulating a positive impact on performance in the maize 
sector as well as in other agricultural sectors. These reforms would also have a significant 
impact on poverty eradication, but the distributional impact would vary among households, 
depending on their location.  
 Finally, regional trade within East Africa seems to have a role to play, not only 
in order to bridge shortfalls in a specific country but also perhaps to stabilise prices in the 
region. How to address regional issues in connection with the efforts to facilitate trade is a 
policy recommendation to be explored further. More specifically, what would be the likely 
impact of mutually liberalised regional trade on the poorer households in Uganda, Tanzania 
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